Perspective s On The Mind
There is a Sufi ( I) tradit ion that forty wise men once were blindfolded , a nd th e n pr es ented with an elephant. One man only touch ed th e trunk a nd described a long cylind rica l object. Anoth er touch ed th e tai l, anoth er a leg , a no t he r th e tu sk-t hey each d escribed only a part of th e e le pha nt. Only by cons u lt ing together could th ey d escribe th e whole ele pha n t. In a se nse, Hundert und ert ak es a sim ila r pr oj ect alone in his att empt to describe th e int erfaces among Philosophy, Psychi at ry a nd Neurosci ence.
H e op ens with a quot e fr om Lord Br ain: "T he br ain a nd th e mind const it u te a unity, and we may leave to th e phil osoph ers, who have se pa ra te d th em in th oug ht, th e task of putting th em together again (2 ) ." The rest of th e book re presen ts Hundert's att empt to t ak e up Br ain 's cha lle nge. As a psychiatrist with phil osop hical training , Hundert d emonstrat es famili arity with th e phil osophi es of Desca rt es, Ka nt, and H egel, as well as a co m pre he nsive understanding of clini cal psychi at ry a nd t he problems of neuroscien ce. This is a tall o rde r for th e ave rage read er, but if a nyone ca n follow him through this di scourse, I think it would be th e hum ani stica llyed uc a te d psychiatrist. Thankfully, with his familiar a nd unpret entiou s writ in g sty le, Hundert avoids mak ing an a lr eady difficult subject more ob scure.
Hundert begins with a d escription of th e philosophical a nalysis of th e mind from Descart es to Hegel. With his "Cogito, ergo Sum" ("I think , th erefore I am ") , Descartes divided th e world into physical obje cts and thou ghts. Kant next mad e th e jump "from subjectivity to obj ectivity" by insisting that human thought is incon ceivab le without something to th ink about, i.e., an expe rience of exte rnal obj ect s. Kan t th en mak es his un iqu e discovery, th e ca te gories of thought. H e hypoth esiz ed th a t our cog nit io n of ex te rn a l obje cts is th e result of our int erpret ation of th ose objects by m eans of faculties of th e mind , su ch as th e perception of space , tim e a nd se nsations . These ca te go ries of thought produce human knowledge, whi ch requires th ou ght s and obj ect s. In Kant 's own words: " T houg hts without con te nt a re e m p ty, int uit ions without conce pts are blind" (2) . Kant cre a te d his own dil emm a , however; th e passive distortion of obj ects by th ought st ill does not guarant ee th at we co m pre hen d t he
world as it really is " in it self." Ent er H egel. Hi s key con tribu t ion is t hat th e mind is not simply a passive int erpret er of objects, but also an ac t ive agent in th e cre a t io n of th e human world. The human mind, H egel's " Geis t ," helps cre a te th e objects e ncou n te re d in human expe rie nce . H ence human kn owled ge is true, not becau se subjective ideas corre spond to ex te rn a l obj ect s, but becau se subjective ideas a nd ex te rn a l obj ects t og ether belong to a co he re n t whol e, cre a te d in t he course of human history by mankind it self. Philosophy becom es hi storical , and , claims H egel, th ereb y becom es scie nt ific.
Kant 's definition of philosophy had been th e searc h fo r a priori knowledge, i.e., knowled ge independent of particul ar fac ts. In con t rast, H egel ina ugu ra ted th e scientific notion th at knowledge was cha racte ristically a posteriori-it dep end ed on ex pe rie nce for co nfir mation or refut ation. In Hundert 's te rms, H eg el proceed ed " from obj ecti vit y to ontolo gy," " a scie nce of th e ex iste nce of m an," op ening th e way for th e end of m etaphysics a nd th e beginnin g of ph enom e nology, t he study of livin g ex pe rie nce. W e live, sa id H egel. That is th e first truth, not "we t hink, " as Desca r tes assert ed , and no t "we interpret ," as Kan t implied . Kn owled ge is not a straight lin e fr om man to th e worl d , o r fro m th e world to man. It is a circle, embracing humanity a nd th e world. U sin g H egel 's conce p t of " knowing as livin g," Hunder t proceeds to exa m ine Pi aget 's studies o n how child re n cons t ruc t th eir a bility to kn ow t he world as part and parcel of their ro le as d eveloping yo ung m embers of t he hu m a n ra ce . H e th en add resses Freud 's di scove ry that our th ou ghts are not mere ly objective and purely int ell ectu al as th e philosophe rs had im agined , but rat her, th ey are permeated with e mo tions and, in many ways, con t ro lle d by ou r in stinct s a nd emotional lives. Feeling and thinking are not totally different and for that m a tt er, neithe r are " fee lings and things." And, if " a ll objects a re sim ulta neous ly cog nit ive an d affective," do es not Hund ert m ak e his point a bou t th e need to unit e philosophy a nd psycho logy in som e way?
Perhaps th e m os t fascin ating psychi at ri c chap ter involves Hund e r t 's inte rp retation of psych osis. H e rej ect s th e tradition al d escript ion of psyc hosis as defective reality t esting, a nd inst ead , bas ed on ph en om enological a nalysis, suggests that if th e mind 's ca tegories fail to organize reality, th e n th e psyc ho tic de lusion may be a n at te m pt to recr eat e some so r t of reality. Alt ho ug h d istort ed , perhaps psych oti c delusions too serve a fun cti on . As Elvin Se m rad once remarked, t he onl y othe r alte rn a tive m ay be suicide or mu rd er. Hunde rt th en summons up th e ghost of th e id eali st wit hin us, Don Quixot e, whose crea to r, Ce rvan tes, once re m a r ked that a t times " fac ts get in th e way of truth ." "Sanity mu st mean some t hing," wri t es Hunde r t (2), a prop ositi on we psychi atrist s often tak e fo r g ra n te d whe n we co nce n t rate only on und e rsta nding insanit y. Hund ert see ms to imply th at th e mi stake of philosophy was that it tried to defin e truth by contrasting it with er ror in order t o give m ea ni ng to hum a n existe nce. Philosophy has trad itionally exam ine d th e th eory of kn owled ge as a m eans to underst anding th e m eaning of life. Perhaps we need to co nne ct th a t philosophical tradition with psychological perspectives on sanity in th e light of madness in orde r to better find th e path to the meaning of life.
Hund ert conclud es his book by trying to link truth to biol ogy. H u m a n kn owledge is true for all humans, h e argues, because it is derived from hum ani ty's biol ogical a nd social history, as a result of the evolution of the species a nd of civilization . The br ai n provides th e key to this conclusion, for it has two functions: it is a " m ec hanism for expe rie ncing" and as su ch, is a passive recept acl e, as in Kant 's m od el. Bu t Kant 's mistake wa s to eq ua te this psychological property of brain fun cti on with phi losophical truth. The brain is also a "tool for knowing" as H eg el not ed ; as suc h, it is a n ac t ive creator of knowledge, and yet it is cre a t ed by that whi ch it cr eates -Nat ure. H e nce it possesses an internal validity: cre a t ed by nature, it co m pre he nds a nd shapes na t ure in return. That is th e basis of the validity of human knowled ge, a va lidi ty t ha t is universal for humans but con tingen t on who we have becom e throu gh th e evolu tion of nature and human civilization.
"In reuniting subj ect and obj ect, thought s a nd things . . . we also put an end to th e exist ence of any 'obj ective ne cessary' truth superior to ac t ua l lived expe rie nce " (2) . The shadow of giant minds ca n get quit e damp and dark. Hundert has taken an arduous journey through th e chilly regions of abstract thought a nd has re t u rned with a mod ern, unpresumptuous way of int egrating cu r re n t biol ogi cal a nd psychological knowledge with that core of philosophical issues whi ch , wh ether we recognize it or not, constantly vexes us as human beings. W e would do well to re cogn ize the significance of this grand proj ect th e next tim e we wonder wh e th er so m e idea is tru e or not. 
